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Faced with aging populations and especially heightened fiscal constraints, large scale pension
reforms were implemented in many affluent democracies during the 1990s. Canadian reforms, by
contrast, were quite modest and old age security benefits emerged largely unscathed. Drawing on
the comparative experience of other OECD nations, we highlight four characteristics of the Canadian
pension system and the policy environment to account for this relative stability:(1) the comparatively
modest scale of Canadian public sector pension expenditures; (2) relatively greater reliance on
general revenue as opposed to payroll taxes to finance these expenditures; (3) the availability of other
expenditure targets,  notably health care, post-secondary education and social assistance, that could
be cut with less political backlash; and (4) a pension design that allocates the public sector share
disproportionately to the bottom end of the income distribution, precluding the emergence of the
oppositional politics that fueled public debate elsewhere. 
Stasis amidst change: 
Canadian pension reform in an age of retrenchment 
 




The ongoing debate on pension reform among policy-makers in East Asian, North 
American and West European countries has been framed by a conventional discourse 
depicting a developing demographic time bomb as the elderly population grows in 
relation to the overall population (Béland and Waddan 2000). Since the 1980s, these 
demographic fears as well as macro economic constraints related to economic 
globalisation and regional integration have favoured the enactment of various pension 
reforms in East Asia, North America and Western Europe.  
  As in most countries, Canada’s national pension system is largely a product of the 
age of welfare state expansion that extended from the 1950s to the 1970s (see Section I). 
The result was a public system that might be characterized as a small-scale version of the 
traditional Swedish design: a universal flat benefit for all seniors (Old Age Security), 
supplemented by a guaranteed minimum (income-tested) pension (the Guaranteed 
Income Supplement), and a modest second tier of earnings-related pensions (the Canada 
and Quebec Pension Plans). Middle and upper-income families supplement these benefits 
with employment-based pensions (Registered Pension Plans or RPPs) and personal 
retirement accounts (Registered Retirement Savings Plans or RRSPs). All of these 
elements were in place by the end of the 1960s.  
                                                 




  Since then, pension reform has emerged as a ‘hot point’ on the legislative agenda 
in three distinct periods. The period from mid-seventies to the early eighties brought the 
so-called Great Pension Debate, a high profile but ultimately doomed attempt to expand 
the modest second-tier earnings-related plan to European-like levels. The appropriate 
points of contrast here are the set of other ‘latecomer’ countries (Myles and Pierson 
2001), nations that by 1980 had no (Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand) or, like 
Canada, only modest (Denmark, Switzerland) second-tier earnings-related plans by 1980. 
For all but New Zealand, the 1980s were a period of pension expansion, typically led by 
organized labour. In these cases, however, expansion took the form of mandatory, 
typically funded, employer plans. In Canada, mandatory employer pensions were viewed 
by the reformers as a second best, inferior, solution and were never aggressively pursued. 
The result was no change.  
  Talk of expansion was quickly succeeded by the politics of retrenchment and can 
be divided into two periods: the first under the Conservative government of Brian 
Mulroney (1984-1993) and the second under Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (since 
1993). In both periods, the universal flat benefit (Old Age Security) was targeted for 
reform with limited success. Here the appropriate points of contrast are Sweden and 
Finland. In both countries formerly universal flat rate pension benefits provided to all 
elderly citizens were ‘clawed back’ (to use the Canadian term) from high income earners 
by means of a  ‘pension test’ (Myles and Quadagno 1997). The Mulroney government 
succeeded in introducing an ‘income test’ for flat rate pensions in 1989 but as we show 




back Old Age Security benefits from middle income seniors in the 1990s (see Battle 
1997), in contrast, did not get beyond the proposal stage.   
Finally, amidst the usual rhetoric of ‘unsustainability’, the second tier earnings-related 
scheme (the Canada Pension Plan) was put on the reform agenda in the mid-nineties. The 
results were equally modest and served mainly to maintain the status quo. Contribution 
rates were raised to create a surplus to be invested in the equity markets with future 
revenues used to finance future benefits. This increase in ‘advance funding’ was aimed at 
maintaining benefit levels while smoothing out the effects of demographic change on 
contribution rates across successive cohorts of workers. The appropriate points of 
contrast here are the rather more draconian changes to second-tier earnings-related plans 
characteristic of many European countries since the early nineties.  
  In sum, against the comparative backdrop of the other affluent democracies, our 
main conclusion is that, on the benefit side, relatively little has changed to the basic 
pension design constructed in the fifties and sixties. Answering the question ‘why not?’, 
we contend, holds instructive lessons not only for understanding the Canadian case but 
also for making sense of larger scale reforms elsewhere. An obvious part of the answer is 
that ‘size matters.’ Like the other Anglo-Saxon countries, Canadian public sector pension 
expenditures are comparatively modest by international standards (about 5.5 per cent of 
GDP in the 1990s) and Canadian retirees receive a larger fraction (about 50 per cent) of 
their incomes from private occupational pensions, personal retirement accounts and other 
forms of savings. The upshot is that the potential contribution of pension cuts to other 




highlight in the discussion, governments found more tempting targets in other parts of the 
social policy matrix.  
Less obvious, perhaps, is our claim that the financing mechanism – the composition of 
the tax budget used to finance public benefits – probably matters more. Unlike most 
countries that rely mainly on payroll taxes to finance old age pensions, Canada’s pension 
budget is divided more or less evenly between payroll taxes and general revenue 
financing. High and rising payroll taxes, we argue, create strong incentives (and unusual 
coalitions) for reform that are comparatively weak in the Canadian context.  
  More tentatively, we make a claim about the ‘moral economy’ of reform. At the 
end of the day, all would-be reformers face the challenge of legitimating reforms with 
their publics by demonstrating that they correspond to some form of popularly held 
notions of justice or fairness. Many European reforms involved changes to benefit 
formulas that could readily be defended on the grounds that they involved elimination of 
inter-personal transfers (e.g. from private to public sector workers) that were 
indefensible. Large savings could be made by ‘rationalizing redistribution’ in public 
sector schemes (Myles and Pierson 2001). In the U.S., the rhetoric of “intergenerational 
equity” was deployed in (still largely unsuccessful) efforts to cut Social Security. The 
claim was that scarce transfer dollars that could go to poor families with children were 
being allocated to relatively affluent, high income, retirees. The Canadian  system 
disproportionately allocates the public sector share to the bottom end of the income 
distribution (Myles 2000), providing precious little room for such a rhetoric to take hold 




Finally, and perhaps more importantly, successive Canadian governments found 
other targets for reform in their pursuit of deficit and debt reduction.  During the golden 
age of expansion, political parties were eager to claim credit for new programs. 
Retrenchment, in contrast, is generally an exercise in blame avoidance rather than credit 
claiming (Weaver 1986). Health care, post-secondary education and social assistance 
provided targets amenable to cost cutting without the associated political backlash likely 
to follow from significant reductions in pension expenditures. 
 
The emergence of the Canadian pension system 
During the 1950s and 1960s, Canada constructed a retirement income system around 
three tiers: 1) Old Age Security (OAS), a universal, flat-rate pension supplemented by 
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) that provides a guaranteed income for seniors 
without additional sources of income, both financed from general revenue;
1 2) the 
Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP), that provide a second 
tier of earning-related public pensions financed from payroll contributions
2; and 3) 
private, though tax-subsidized, employer-sponsored Registered Retirement Plans (RPPs) 
and individual retirement savings accounts called Registered Retirement Savings Plans 
(RRSPs).  
Canada’s first national pension legislation, the Old Age Pensions Act (OAP), was enacted 
in 1927 and provided $20 per month to persons over 70 on a means-tested basis (Bryden 
                                                 
1 Most of the ten provinces and the three territories also offer benefits that top up the GIS.  Considering 
their modest scale, this paper does not discuss directly the fate of these provincial programs. 




1974). In 1951, the Old Age Security Act (OAS) eliminated the means-test and extended 
the then current benefit of $40 per month to all persons aged 70 and over meeting 
residency requirements. The Old Age Assistance Act (OAA) extended means-tested 
benefits to those aged 65-69 and remained in place until 1970 by which time the age of 
eligibility for the universal pension (OAS) had been reduced to 65. 
The Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) was established in 1967 as the second 
component of the pension system’s first tier (Bryden, 1974: 130-137; Guest, 1997: 144-
145). Though initially intended as a temporary measure until the C/QPP matured, it has 
remained as a permanent and critical element for providing an income floor for the 
elderly. Benefits are subject to an income test – benefits are reduced $0.50 for each 
additional dollar in other income – rather than a means test (i.e. assets are excluded from 
the test) so that the program functions as guaranteed income (or negative income tax) 
program.
3 By the mid-1980s the combination of OAS/GIS provided an income floor 
equal to 50 per cent of average earning for an elderly couple and 31 per cent for a single 
individual. 
Two years earlier, in 1965, legislation to introduce a second tier of earnings-
related pensions – the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans – was adopted. This legislation 
was the outcome of a long bargaining process between the federal government and the 
ten provinces. As a result of Quebec’s campaign for greater provincial autonomy, two 
                                                 
3 In 1975, a Spouse’s Allowance (SPA) was added to the first tier of the federal pension system in order to 
provide one-pensioner-couples facing economic hardship with more financial support. Like the GIS, the 




separate but highly coordinated earning-related schemes were created.
4 Financed through 
contributions from employees, employers and self-employed persons, the C/QPP 
integrates nearly all employed persons aged between 18 and 70 who make more than a 
minimum level of earnings during each year. These two social insurance schemes protect 
the contributors and their families against the loss of income due to retirement, disability 
and death. The replacement rate of the C/QPP monthly retirement pension represents 25 
per cent of a beneficiary’s average monthly earnings during his/her contributory life. 
Together, OAS and the maximum C/QPP benefit replace approximately 40 per cent of 
earnings for the average wage earner, a modest amount by European and even U.S. 
standards. Between 1966 and 1970, the eligible age for C/QPP benefits dropped from 68 
to 65 and since 1987 actuarially reduced benefits can be accessed at age 60.
5 
 From the outset both the CPP and QPP relied on partial funding as a result of the surplus 
of contributions built up in the early years of the plans. Importantly, however, assets from 
the QPP trust fund were invested in equities and real estate, to support provincial 
economic growth and French Canadian entrepreneurship (Thomson 1984) while CPP 
surpluses were lent to the provinces at preferred rates to subsidize provincial debt. This 
difference was a direct outcome of the 1960s Quiet Revolution, an attempt to modernize 
                                                 
4 Benefits from either scheme are based on pension credits accumulated under both, as if only one scheme 
existed. On the federal/provincial bargaining process leading to the enactment of the C/QPP, see Simeon, 
1972 and Bryden, 1974: 129-182. 
5 In Canada during the 1990s, there was no explicit attempt to increase the C/QPP retirement age. 
 
6 For constitutional reasons, the regulation of private pension plans in Canada is divided among the eleven 




Quebec society and to improve the socio-economic status of the province’s French-
speaking majority.  
The third tier of the Canadian pension system was actually the first to emerge. 
Since the end of the 19
th century, Canadian firms and insurance companies have created a 
variety of private pension plans and personal savings schemes. It is estimated that in 
1936, enterprise-based pension plans covered less than 10 or 15 per cent of the Canadian 
paid workforce. Thirty-four years later in 1970, private pensions covered 39.2 per cent of 
the paid workforce (Bryden 1974, pp. 40-41) a figure that was essentially unchanged by 
the end of the 1990s (Statistics Canada 2001, p. 16). Since the enactment of the Pension 
Benefits Act in 1965, both the federal and the ten provincial governments have regulated 
private pension plans through the registration process and the Income Tax Act. In order 
to qualify for tax shelter, private pension plans must comply with specific governmental 
rules concerning coverage and financing.
6 It is worth mentioning that the term Registered 
Pension Plans (RPPs) refers to employment-based schemes for public as well as private 
sector workers.   
  The federal government also plays a decisive regulatory role in the field of 
personal retirement accounts, which are widespread in Canada. Registered Retirement 
Savings Plans (RRSPs) were created in 1957 to allow self-employed workers to save for 
retirement. Actually, all employees can contribute to RRSPs, even if they also participate 
in employment-based schemes. Employers can also contribute on a group basis to RRSPs 
for their staff. Upon maturity the assets are commonly used to purchase a life annuity, but 
two other options are possible. A guaranteed annuity may be purchased, or assets may be 




timing of the withdrawals  (Coward 1995, p. 11). In 1999, almost 60 per cent of Canadian 
families had RRSPs or RRIFs (Registered Retirement Income Funds),
7 with a median 
value of about $20 000 (Maser and Dufour 2001, p. 14). While coverage by these 
personal retirement accounts is exceptionally high by international standards (OECD, 
2001), the bulk of RRSP assets are held by middle and upper income workers.  
 
From the ‘Great Pension Debate’ to the politics of retrenchment 
The earliest stage of the current Canadian politics of pension reform can be found in the 
so-called ‘Great Pension Debate’ of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The debate was 
launched in 1975 when the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) advanced a proposal to 
double C/QPP benefits and contributions. At the time, there was a general consensus 
concerning the need to increase benefits targeted at low-income elderly (especially 
elderly women). But the main issue at stake was over the use of the public pension 
system to ameliorate income security in light of tepid growth in private sector coverage. 
While labour unions, women’s rights groups and social reform lobbies clearly supported 
a widespread expansion of the C/QPP to meet the needs of Canadian workers, voices 
within the Canadian business community opposed an increase in payroll contribution 
rates. From their perspective, the solution to income security problems lay in the growth 
of private pensions. Moreover, provincial leaders, especially those from Ontario and 
Quebec, could not agree on the suitable course of reform (Banting 1987). Because the 
C/QPP had many qualities lacking in private pension plans (indexing, portability, low 
                                                 
7 RRIFs are tax-deferred investments offered as payout options from RRSPs. 




administrative costs, universal coverage of the labour force), a federal report published in 
1980 favoured the public sector option supported by left-wing groups and Quebec’s 
political leaders (Task Force on Retirement Income Policy 1980). The inability of the 
business sector to reach consensus on a private sector solution also contributed to the 
ideological success of the public solution. While large firms were willing to accept 
mandatory private pensions to put an end to the coverage problem, small businesses 
opposed this option (Myles 1988, p. 46).    
  In addition to business opposition, proponents of the public sector solution faced 
the de facto ‘veto power’ of Ontario, Canada’s largest province. Because the federal and 
provincial governments share constitutional responsibility for this program, Ottawa must 
reach an agreement with at least two-thirds of the provinces representing two-thirds of 
the Canadian population before enacting a reform (Battle 1997, p. 538). During the late 
1970s and the early 1980s, the pro-business conservative government of Ontario, by far 
the most populous Canadian province, opposed any attempt to significantly expand the 
C/QPP.
8 The institutional structure of Canadian federalism at the origin of provincial 
‘veto power’ – combined with the opposition of the business sector – was instrumental in 
the defeat of left-wing forces supporting a public solution to the ‘pension problem’ 
(Banting 1987, pp. 62-69). As we shall see, however, the same constitutional obstacle 
was a key element restraining serious consideration of cutbacks in the following decade. 
Despite the many and voluminous reports on the topic, the reform movement began to 
wither with the onset of recession in 1982.  
 It  is  instructive  to compare Canada’s experience in the 1980s with that of the 




Netherlands, New Zealand) or, like Canada, only modest (Denmark, Switzerland) 
second-tier earnings-related plans by 1980. For all but New Zealand, the 1980s were a 
period of pension expansion, typically led by organized labour leading to the 
establishment of mandatory (or quasi-mandatory) employer plans. From the outset, 
however, Canadian labour and its allies in the reform project rejected this strategy and the 
result was no change.  
 
The failed assault on ‘universality’ 
The economic recession of 1982 dissipated these reform forces while contributing to a 
gradual transformation of the Canadian policy agenda. Rising unemployment and a 
decline in economic activity increased social spending and expanded the federal deficit. 
The Great Pension Debate ended as fiscal austerity and economic liberalism came to 
dominate the Canadian political arena. The Conservative Party’s widespread victory 
during the 1984 federal elections concretised this ideological and political shift.
9 During 
the electoral campaign, soon-to-be Prime Minister Brian Mulroney publicly questioned 
OAS ‘universal coverage’, arguing that ‘wealthy bankers’ wives’ should not be receiving 
OAS benefits. Social movements, old-age organizations and labour unions opposed the 
idea of targeting OAS benefits, forcing Mulroney to back away.
10 But his promise to fight 
the federal deficit meant that social programs financed through general revenues such as 
the OAS had become potential targets for retrenchment (Myles 1988, p. 49)     
                                                 
9 The Conservatives won 211 of the 282 seats in September 1984.  
10 Immediately after the election, his Finance Minister reopened the debate on universality, but Mulroney 




In May 1985, approximately nine months after the election, the Conservatives 
launched the first serious retrenchment attempt in the field of pension reform. Rather than 
abolish universal flat rate benefits, the first Budget proposed the ‘partial deindexation’ of 
family allowances and OAS.
11  These indirect cutbacks were aimed at saving the federal 
treasury approximately four billion dollars or so over the next five years as a result of the 
gradual erosion of benefits. Unfortunately for Brian Mulroney and Finance Minister 
Michael Wilson, the ‘partial deindexation’ issue created a true ‘political tempest’ across 
the country. In addition to labour unions and anti-poverty groups, old-age organizations 
participated actively in the two-month long campaign that would finally force the 
conservative government to discard the ‘partial deindexation’ proposal. The mass media 
also played a decisive role in that campaign. A famous televised encounter between the 
tall Prime Minister and a petite but vocal French Canadian woman named Solange Denis, 
became a national symbol of the conflict between ‘greedy politicians’ and the ‘deprived 
elderly’, and in this instance the politicians backed down. While this episode was then 
perceived as proof of the emerging power of a powerful ‘grey lobby’ in Canada, the 1985 
debate appears more as an exception than as a new ‘iron rule’ of Canadian politics (Battle 
1997, p. 530). Far less vocal and well organized than its US counterpart, the Canadian 
‘grey lobby’ has never played a truly central role in pension politics since that time.
12 
                                                 
11 According to the plan, OAS benefits would only increase by the amount that inflation surpasses 3 per 
cent. ‘If inflation were 3% or higher a year, then OAS benefits would automatically loose 3% of their 
value. Even if inflation were less than 3%, benefits would decline by the amount of inflation (e.g. an 
inflation rate of 2% would reduce the value of OAS by 2%).’ (Battle, 1997: 530-531)  




The defeat of ‘partial indexation’ probably convinced conservative politicians that 
‘visible’ cutbacks in established social programs was a source of excessive ‘political 
risks.’
13 During the second half of the 1980s, the Conservative government did in fact 
turn to a blame-avoidance strategy aimed at reducing ‘political risks’ related to 
retrenchment while ending universality ‘through the back door.’
14 In 1989, the 
Conservatives successfully implemented a ‘clawback’ of OAS benefits from very high-
income seniors that was largely ignored by the media. Benefits for individuals with 
incomes greater than $51 765 were reduced by 15 per cent for every dollar of income 
above the threshold with all benefits disappearing at approximately $89 000 per year. 
However, the cut-off point ($51 765) where the clawback would come into effect was 
only indexed to inflation in excess of 3 per cent so that in real terms a growing share of 
seniors could be affected with the passage of time. Since the huge majority of the elderly 
were unaffected and few politicians or journalists understood the longer-term 
implications of the reform, the clawback came to be identified as ‘social policy by 
stealth’ (Battle 1990).  
Low inflation and slow income growth during the 1990s, however, meant that by 
2001, less than 5 per cent of all seniors were affected by the income test introduced in 
1989. In 2000, full indexation was restored with the result that future savings from the 
                                                 
13 In the Canadian parliamentary system, the strong centralization of power creates a high level of 
autonomy that could exacerbate political risks related to pension reform (Pierson and Weaver, 1993) 
14 This strategy, which was also mobilized in other social policy areas, was labelled as ‘social policy by 




clawback will only occur as a result of a significant increase in the numbers of very high-
income retirees.   
 
The rise and fall of Seniors Benefits 
After some reluctance, the Liberals moved forward on pension reform in 1995. With the 
‘war on the deficit’ and demographic fears as a background, the 1995 Budget formulated 
five principles for the reform of public pensions (1995 Budget cited in Battle 1997, p. 
539): 
1. undiminished protection for less well-off seniors; 
2. continued full indexation to protect seniors from inflation;  
3. provision of OAS benefits on the basis of family income;  
4. greater progressivity of benefits by income level; and  
5. control of program costs. 
Far from departing from the Conservative agenda, these design criteria reinforced the 
logic of pension reform that emerged during the second half of the 1980s, the effective 
abolition of universal flat rate pensions.  
                                                 
15 The same strategy has been used in the US concerning the gradual change in retirement age enacted as 




Targeting was still highly controversial in 1995, but the Liberals made sure to avoid the 
mistake of the first Mulroney government, which was to call into question full indexation 
of benefits. The spectre of Solange Denis’s colourful encounter with Brian Mulroney was 
a source of ‘political learning’ for elected politicians interested in reducing political risks 
related to pension reform (Caragata 1995).  
  In 1996, the Liberals unveiled a new reform project far more explicit than the  
OAS ‘reform by stealth’ enacted in 1989. The government  proposed to replace both 
OAS and GIS programs with a new Seniors Benefit that would integrate the two in a 
single income-tested scheme. Generally speaking, low and even middle-income families 
would benefit from the new scheme and high-income retirees would bear the brunt of 
reform. For example, a family  receiving $20 000 per year on top of the Seniors Benefit 
would gain $500 per year under the new system. But families with $50 000 per year of 
other retirement income would lose more than $4000 per year as a result of the new 
legislation (Geddes 1998, p. 13). Unlike the 1989 clawback that was calculated on the 
basis of individual income, the clawback implicit in the new Seniors Benefit was to be 
based on family income, thus impacting a much larger pool of retirees.   
To minimize the risk of political backlash among the wealthiest segment of the elderly 
population, Finance Minister Paul Martin stressed that current OAS/GIS beneficiaries 
would not be affected by the reform. Later,  this commitment was expanded to ‘apply to 
everyone age 60 and over as of December 31, 1995, as well as their spouses, regardless 
of their age.’ (Government of Canada, 1996a)
15  
  Despite these efforts at blame avoidance, organized groups representing not only 




the proposal. At the beginning of 1997, the Retirement Income Coalition sealed an   
alliance between 21 of these groups, including the Canadian Teachers’ Federation, the 
Investment Dealers Association and the Canadian Association of Retired Persons. This 
new coalition generated considerable media attention on the potentially negative impact 
of the reform on savings behaviour (Geddes 1998). As Reform Party MP Keith Martin 
(1997) argued:  
This new Seniors' Benefit is obviously not much of a benefit at all, but a seniors tax. It 
penalizes those who have sacrificed and saved for their retirements. Ultimately, it will 
make more people dependent on taxpayer-funded, low return, government controlled 
pensions instead of enabling people to earn a more lucrative pension through their 
investments, such as RRSP's.  
From this perspective, the Seniors Benefit would discourage personal savings and 
encourage ‘welfare dependency.’   
  At the other end of the political spectrum, women’s organizations and NDP 
officials also criticized the Seniors Benefits. The NDP leader, Alexa McDonough, 
summarized widespread feminist concerns about the proposed scheme: ‘Senior women 
currently receive the OAS directly, but the Seniors Benefit Program will be calculated on 
a couple's combined income. Older women may lose their Seniors Benefit based on the 
income of their spouse, threatening their financial independence.’ (McDonough 1997) 
Considering that the Bloc Québécois and most social reform organizations also rejected 
the Seniors Benefit, political support for this measure appeared weak.    
  Facing considerable pressure from social movements, the Retirement Income 




controversial reform proposal, more than two years before it was to take effect. Referring 
to renewed economic prosperity and a shrinking federal deficit, Finance Minister Paul 
Martin found an elegant way to justify his retreat: 
The reform of the OAS/GIS was launched at a time when our choices were 
restricted by the overwhelming constraint of a $38 billion deficit and, as 
importantly, a debt-to-GDP ratio that had risen virtually uninterrupted since the 
mid-1970s. Because of these two very real fiscal factors, the proposal made in 
1995 represented the best choice available at the time. That being said, any choice 
that depended on taking money out of the retirement income system was far from 
ideal. Three years later, our prospects have changed for the better and a much 
wider set of choices is now available. (Martin 1998)  
Now that the federal government was expecting long-term fiscal surpluses, the idea that  
future retirees had to make significant economic sacrifices in the name of fiscal austerity 
was difficult to justify.  
  The fall of the Seniors Benefit proposal is related to a strategic mistake of the 
liberal government. Instead of relying on hidden fiscal changes that silently affect 
wealthier beneficiaries, Paul Martin launched a highly visible reform project that 
attracted too much attention to neutralize the political risks associated with the politics of 
retrenchment. Despite their decision to postpone the implementation of the Seniors 
Benefit and their commitment to indexation and social redistribution, the proposal 
attracted widespread media attention to a reform project that upset key interest groups 
and a significant fraction of the population. Moreover, unpopular budget cuts enacted 




transfers to provincial governments reduced the political ‘security margin’ of the 
government in the field of pension retrenchment.
16  Hence, while OAS became a target 
for reform under two political regimes, at the end of the day little was changed.  
 
The politics of consultation: reforming the Canada Pension Plan  
In 1995, the publication of the Fiftieth Actuarial Report of the CPP suddenly pushed this 
program to the centre of the Canadian policy agenda. Due to a significant increase in 
disability benefits and the impact of the economic recession, this report projected a higher 
schedule for future contributions than anticipated by the previous actuarial report. 
Without a significant change in the current schedule of contribution rates, by the year 
2015, the CPP would no longer collect enough revenues to pay all the benefits (Battle 
1997, p. 537).
17 
  While the Reform Party and conservative think tanks such as the CD Howe 
Institute responded with proposals to replace the public pay-as-you-go system with 
private sector alternatives, the governing Liberals launched a consultative process aimed 
at reforming the program in an incremental manner. This consultative turn in pension 
reform is related to a key institutional feature of the CPP noted earlier: since the federal 
and provincial governments share constitutional responsibility for this program, Ottawa 
must reach an agreement with at least two-thirds of the provinces with two-thirds of the 
population before enacting a reform (Battle 1997, p. 538).  
                                                 
16 On these related retrenchment efforts, see Banting, 1997; Rice and Prince, 2000: 110-129. 
17 Between 1966 and 1986, a contribution rate of only 3.6 per cent prevailed. In 1993, such a rate had risen 




  After a first round of consultation, the Department of Finance drafted a joint 
report that evaluated the long-term financial situation of the CPP while setting the agenda 
for a consensual reform. Published in February 1996, this Information Paper for 
Consultations on the Canada Pension Plan (Federal/Provincial/Territorial CPP 
Consultations Secretariat 1996) formed the basis of public consultations on the CPP that 
were held across Canada in 1996. The consultations were part of the statutory review of 
the CPP carried out by the federal and provincial governments. Meanwhile, Quebec 
conducted its own public consultations within the province concerning the QPP 
(Government of Canada, 1996b). In November of the same year, the federal and 
provincial governments published a joint statement to frame the principles that would 
guide the elaboration of the next CPP reform. Among the nine principles outlined in the 
statement, two were especially significant:  
4. The CPP must be affordable and sustainable for future generations. This 
requires fuller funding and a contribution rate no higher than the already 
legislated future rate of 10.1 per cent. In deciding how quickly to move to this 
rate, governments must take economic and fiscal impacts into account.  
8. CPP funds must be invested in the best interests of plan members, and maintain a 
proper balance between returns and investment risk. Governance structures must be 
created to ensure sound fund management (Government of Canada, 1996c). 
While the first of these principles reflects a strong emphasis on ‘economic 
competitiveness’, the second one is the product of a policy learning process related to the 
existence of the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, a provincial investment board 




of this provincial scheme paved the way to the investment of CPP surplus funds in 
equities by providing the federal and other provincial governments with a positive 
precedent.
18  
  Finance Minister Paul Martin finally presented the draft of the new CPP 
legislation in February 1997. Following the principles formulated a year before in the 
Information Paper for Consultations on the Canada Pension Plan, it was decided to 
increase combined employer and employee contributions to the CPP from 5.6 to 9.9 per 
cent by 2003 in order to build up a larger reserve fund.
19 The fund was then equivalent in 
value to about two years of benefits and was projected to decline. As a result of reform, it 
is now scheduled to grow to five years of benefits with the surplus invested in a 
diversified portfolio of securities ‘to earn higher returns and help pay the benefits as 
Canada’s population ages’ (Martin, Paul 1997). In order to invest the reserve fund, a CPP 
Investment Board was created. This new organization is governed by a board of directors 
and is managed by investment professionals from the private sector. By 31 March 2001, 
the CPP Investment Board  ‘had 7.2 billion dollars invested in Canadian and foreign 
equities and by 2011’ the board ‘expects to be managing at least $130 billion in a 
diversified investment portfolio.’ (CPP Investment Board 2001)  
                                                 
18 During the first half of the 1980s, however, the Caisse de dépôt et placement  faced criticism and 
suspicion from the business community and the federal government, which considered this investment 
board as a mere political tool of nationalism (Brooks and Tanguay, 1985).  More recently, authors such as 
Pierre Arbour have criticized what they considered as the excessive ‘economic power’ of the Caisse 
(Arbour, 1993; 2002).  
19 The government of Quebec enacted the same schedule of contribution increases to harmonize them with 




Finally enacted in January 1998, Bill C-2 included other minor modifications aimed at 
improving the long-term financial situation of the CPP. For example, the annual basic 
exemption was frozen at $3500 so that the portion of income subject to contributions will 
increase faster than inflation (Government of Canada 1997). Moreover, ‘retirement 
pensions will be calculated on the 5-year average of the Year’s Maximum Pensionable 
Earnings at the time, instead of the 3-year average.’ (Martin, Paul 1997) Disability 
pensions were also subject to some cost-control measures. To boost public confidence in 
the program, contributors will receive annual reports on their CPP accounts and the 
federal-provincial reviews will be conducted every three years, rather than five years. Far 
from radically breaking from the historical path of the program, the 1997 reform 
reaffirmed the contributory nature of the C/QPP. Moreover, significant (and unpopular) 
reforms such as an increase in retirement age were excluded from the reformers’ agenda.  
  It is worth mentioning that the privatisation of the CPP has never been considered 
as a serious option by Canadian policy-makers. Despite the rhetoric emanating from the 
conservative Canadian Alliance party and Alberta’s Conservative party (for example: 
Martin 1995), pressures to move from social insurance to individual savings accounts are 
far more diffuse in Canada than in the United States. Despite that fact that neo-liberal 
economists and politicians have exploited the demographic fears associated with 
population ageing, public support for the CPP remains strong (Townson 2001, p. 195). 
The 1998 CPP reform reduced these fears by improving the system’s financial balance 
and recent stock market instability (especially in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist 
attacks) has been detrimental to the emergence of a large movement favouring pension 




  Beyond this relative lack of support for privatisation, federal policies enacted 
during the 1980s favoured greater reliance on personal savings and private pension 
schemes. Conservative, as well as Liberal governments, significantly increased the level 
of tax assistance during the 1980s and 1990s to provide greater incentives for Canadians 
to save money for their retirement (Battle 1997, p. 525). These reforms concerned both 
RRSPs and RPPs. Moreover, ‘tax assistance limits were made fairer and more flexible.’ 
(Pearse 2001, p. 214) 
  In spite of these reforms, only 39.1 per cent of the paid workforce participated in 
an enterprise-based pension plan in 1998 (Statistics Canada 2001, p. 16) Poorly covered 
by RPPs, low-income families save little for retirement: ‘The large majority of family 
units with no private pension assets had lower employment incomes. Considering only 
those economic family units with a major income recipient between 25 and 64, just over 
70 per cent of families of two or more with no pension savings had earnings of less than 
$30,000.’ (Maser and Dufour 2001, p. 5) In this context, the public pension system 
represents the main source of economic support for low-income elderly and has brought 
old age poverty to now very low levels (Myles 2000). While some scholars have argued 
that even minor erosion of universality would affect the political support for state-
financed pensions, it seems that the OAS and GIS programs have a strong political basis 
in Canadian society.     
 
Discussion 
Although the window of retrenchment was opened on several occasions in the past two 




intact. The famous ‘clawback’ of OAS benefits introduced in 1989 might have resulted in 
serious long-term erosion of benefits for middle-income seniors since the threshold for 
the income test was partially deindexed. But that door was effectively shut with the return 
to full indexing under the Liberals in 2000. The main result of the 1997 reform of the 
Canada Pension Plan was to raise contribution rates to stabilize the system.  None of this 
was because benign spirits were directing social policy reform. Under pressure from 
rising deficits, both the Conservatives under Brian Mulroney and the Liberals under Jean 
Chrétien spent a great deal of energy, and not a little political capital, in efforts to reduce 
social spending. The Chrétien government was particularly successful in this venture. 
Though both governments flirted with large-scale pension reform, old age benefits 
emerged relatively unscathed. Why so? 
 
Canadian Federalism and the Politics of Blame Avoidance
20 
The designer’s of the original Canadian union envisioned a strong central government 
and under the British North America Act of 1867 assigned all major powers to the central 
government, leaving what were then considered ‘residual’ powers related to health, 
education and welfare (social assistance for the poor) to the provinces. Nevertheless, in 
the post-war decades Ottawa took the lead in reforming all three areas. The Canada 
Assistance Plan (CAP) established in 1966 created a cost-sharing agreement by which 
Ottawa assumed half the cost of provincial welfare and social services that met specified 
conditions. The central governments role in health and post-secondary education was 
consolidated in 1977 under Established Program Financing (EPF) that provided a federal 
                                                 




block grant to the provinces to finance these programs. Although Ottawa established 
basic ground rules for their delivery, the final mix of services and benefits in all three 
areas remained under provincial jurisdiction (Rice and Prince 2000).  
Divided jurisdiction with regard to both the CAP (social assistance) and EPF (health and 
post-secondary education) proved to be a mixed blessing for Ottawa. As these programs 
were expanding, Ottawa received little political credit since the services and benefits they 
provided were delivered under provincial brand names. In a period of retrenchment, 
however, Ottawa was able to retreat from all three areas by cutting transfers to the 
provinces, leaving provincial governments to take the blame, for subsequent reductions in 
services and benefits. In 1995, The Liberals dismantled both the CAP and EPF, replacing 
them with the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) leading to ‘savings’ of 8.5 and 
15.2 percent (or about $7 billion) in the first two years of its existence (Battle 1998, p. 
330). 
In contrast, OAS and GIS are purely federal programs and, in the case of the CPP, 
divided jurisdiction created a decisive check against any serious consideration of large-
scale cutbacks. Reform of the CPP requires the consent of two thirds of the provinces 
containing two thirds of the population. The Province of Quebec made it clear that it 
would oppose any significant benefit cuts as would Saskatchewan and British Columbia, 
then ruled by the social democratic New Democratic Party, effectively removing that 
option from the political agenda.  
   




 As elsewhere, Canadian social politics in the 1990s were influenced by policy models 
associated with the Third Way, a new buzzword that captures the common elements of a 
still inchoate paradigm assigning welfare functions to families, markets and states. The 
‘old’ welfare state, constructed between the 1930s and the 1970s, emphasized protecting 
people from the market. Third Way solutions, by contrast, emphasize programs that both 
provide incentives for and help people to succeed in the market. In addition to, and 
sometimes instead of, the welfare state’s traditional mandate of ‘civilizing capitalism,’ 
Third Wayism assigns responsibility for “nurturing capitalism” (Battle 2001) to welfare 
states. During the 1990s, the major targets for Canadian Third Way reforms were 
unemployment insurance and child benefits. In the case of the former, changes in 
eligibility rules greatly reduced coverage rates among the unemployed. In contrast, 
income-tested child benefits for the ‘working poor’ were greatly expanded to enhance 
work incentives, a path also followed in the U.K. and the U.S.  
Pension policy and population aging get on the radar screen of Third Way advocates 
when they are widely perceived to be reducing employment levels either by encouraging 
early retirement or by driving up payroll taxes. Neither feature has figured prominently in 
Canadian policy debates.  
Because of its modest scale, changes to the age of eligibility for CPP pensions are 
unlikely to have large effects on retirement behaviour except among lower income 
earners, creating obvious equity problems. Such a result would be perverse for 
macroeconomic as well as for distributive reasons. The largest gains to the economy are 
to be had if the most productive workers (the healthy, well educated, and presumably 




if changes to retirement incentives in public sector plans mainly produce higher 
retirement ages among low wage, low productivity workers.  
To induce large changes in retirement ages among middle and upper income wage-
earners in the Canadian context would require extensive regulation of the age at which 
workers can access private sources of retirement wealth (RPPs, RSSPs), on the one hand, 
and, on the other, reforms that eliminate incentives that now bias retirement decisions in 
favour of more retirement and less employment. Early retirement incentives and defined 
benefit formulae that discourage continued employment are examples. But until now, 
there has been precious little pressure on Canadian policy-makers to pursue such an 
agenda and little likelihood of reaching the political consensus required for reform if they 
did. Current and projected ratios of retirees to workers while higher in Canada than in the 
U.S. are well below typical European levels (OECD, 2001, p. 79).  
The major pressure for pension reform in OECD countries is a product of high and rising 
payroll taxes to meet current and future pension expenditures. The payroll tax is a flat 
tax, often with a wage ceiling that makes it regressive. Unlike income taxes, there are no 
exemptions and no allowances for family size. Low-wage workers and especially 
younger families with children typically bear a disproportionate share of the cost as a 
result. These effects are compounded to the extent that high payroll taxes discourage 
employment, especially at the lower end of the labour market where the social safety net, 
minimum wages, or industrial relations systems make it difficult for employers to pass 
such costs on to employees.   
Because of their impact on wage costs (for employers) and the real take-home pay of less 




potent incentive for the formation of somewhat unexpected coalitions of business and 
labour favouring pension reform in many countries (Myles and Pierson 2000). Since low-
wage workers and especially younger families with children typically bear a 
disproportionate share of the cost, union leaders really do face a trade-off between their 
retired and working-age constituents if, as projected in Germany for example, payroll 
taxes were to rise from 22 to 38 percent of payroll in the coming decades.  
 By European and even U.S. standards, however, current and future payroll tax 
levels for pensions in Canada are quite modest, reflecting the modest scale of the C/QPP, 
one the one hand, and on the other greater reliance on general revenue financing (for 
OAS/GIS).  In the mid-nineties, prior to reform, the payroll contribution rate for CPP was 
5.6 per cent (compared to 12.4 per cent in the U.S.) and was projected to peak at 14.2 per 
cent in the next century, a level already exceeded by most European countries. The 1997 
CPP reform accelerated contribution rates early in to create a capital pool the revenues 
from which will be used to finance future benefits. The aim was to reduce future 
increases. After reform, the maximum projected rate for future wage-earners is a modest 
9.8 per cent.  
 
The Moral Economy of Pension Reform 
During the 1980s and 1990s, a remarkable shift in policy debate occurred in a number of 
countries. Whereas in the 1960s the common assumption in old age policy debates was 
that the elderly were ‘too poor,’ by the 1980s the claim that the elderly were ‘too rich’ 
was heard with growing frequency. In the United States, the rapid fall of poverty rates 




fore (Preston 1984) together with charges against the elderly of being ‘greedy geezers.’  
Although ‘population aging’ is often perceived through the pessimistic lens of 
‘apocalyptic demography’ (Prince 2000), the issue of ‘intergenerational equity’ has been 
far less prominent in Canada than in the United States (Marmor et al. 1994). This 
difference, we think, has a real material base. 
   As elsewhere, average incomes among Canadian seniors did rise sharply from the 
1970s to the 1990s and low-income rates among Canadian seniors measured by the usual 
international standard (persons with adjusted incomes less than 50 per cent of the 
median) are among the lowest in the OECD, even when compared to egalitarian Sweden 
(Hauser 1997; Smeeding & Sullivan 1998).
21 But it was difficult to make the claim that 
the elderly were becoming ‘too rich’ (Table 1). In 1980, about 40 per cent of all elderly 
persons were in the bottom quintile, twice the rate for the population as a whole. By 
1995, just over 17 per cent of the elderly were in the bottom quintile, somewhat below 
the level of 20 per cent for the entire population.  However, approximately 80 per cent of 
the shift out of the bottom quintile reflected movement into the second and third quintiles 
and little increase in the proportion of seniors in the top two quintiles.  While the risk of 
poverty fell dramatically over the period, it was difficult to sustain the case that retirees 
were becoming ‘too rich’. 
 
Table 1:  The Distribution of the Population 65+ By 
Income Quintile, 1980-95 
  1980 1990 1995  Change, 
1980-95 
Quintile Bottom  39.7 25.2 17.5 -22.2 
 2
nd 22.1 29.7 32.5 10.5 
 3
rd 12.2 16.2 20.0 7.8 
 4
th 13.3 14.9 16.0 2.7 
 Top 12.8 13.9 14.0 1.2 
Total: all quintiles 100.0 100.0 100.0  




The reason for this outcome is that in combination OAS/GIS, the C/QPP and related 
transfers function much like an enriched flat benefit system on a pre-tax basis and post-
                                                 
21 By the usual international standard, low-income rates among Canadian seniors had fallen to about 5 per 
cent in 1994 compared to a U.S. rate in excess of 20 per cent. And among the population 70+, Canada’s 
low-income rate was below that of Sweden, the usual ‘winner’ in the international league tables on poverty 




tax the overall impact is highly redistributive. This result is highlighted in Table 2 where 
we show average (equivalence adjusted) income transfers from all public plans by source 
and age-specific income quintiles for the population 65+ in 1995.
22 Total pre-tax transfers 
(column 5) of between eleven and twelve thousand dollars or approximately 50 percent 
of the average equivalence adjusted disposable income ($23 000) of all persons 65+ is 






Since early eighties, the universal flat benefit (Old Age Security) system was targeted for 
reform on two occasions but with limited success while the 1997 CPP reform served 
primarily to maintain the status quo. In order to understand why Canadian policy-makers 
enacted reforms that seem so modest from a comparative perspective, we showed that an 
essential part of the answer is that ‘size matters’. Because of the modest level of pension-
related public expenditures in Canada, the potential contribution of pension cuts to deficit 
reduction was comparatively limited. In this context, both Liberal and Conservative 
governments found more attractive targets in other areas of state intervention, especially 
those areas in which the federal government could transfer political risks to provincial 
leaders. As importantly, limited reliance on payroll taxes to finance the public system 
created few incentives for the emergence of the reform coalitions that have been 
                                                 
22  All incomes are adjusted with an equivalence scale to take account of differences in family size. 



















Bottom  2482  7886  928  -181  11 296  11 115 
Second  4610  7158  800  -406  12 568  12 162 
Third  4990  5875  1154  -1546  12 019  10 473 
Fourth  5187  5494  1268  -3701  11 949  8 248 
Top 5358  5248  1350  -12249  11  956  -293 
Source: Myles (2000) calculated from Statistics Canada, Survey of 




characteristic of the high payroll tax countries. Finally, the actual distribution of public 
sector benefits left little room for a moral assault on public pensions by  conservative 
intellectuals and politicians. The upshot is that in Canada public pensions have been a 
point of relative stability in a world of welfare state change.  
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